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Abstract
This driving simulator study, conducted as part of the EU AdaptIVe project,
investigated drivers’ performance in critical traffic events, during the resumption
of control from an automated driving system. Prior to the critical events, using a
between-participant design, 75 drivers were exposed to various screen manipulations
that varied the amount of available visual information from the road environment and
automation state, which aimed to take them progressively further ’out-of-the-loop’
(OoTL). The current paper presents an analysis of the timing, type, and rate of
drivers’ collision avoidance response, also investigating how these were influenced
by the criticality of the unfolding situation. Results showed that the amount of
visual information available to drivers during automation impacted on how quickly
they resumed manual control, with less information associated with slower take-
over times, however, this did not influence the timing of when drivers began a
collision avoidance manoeuvre. Instead, the observed behaviour is in line with recent
accounts emphasising the role of scenario kinematics in the timing of driver avoidance
response. When considering collision incidents in particular, avoidance manoeuvres
were initiated when the situation criticality exceeded an Inverse Time To Collision
value of ≈ 0.3 s−1. Our results suggest that take-over time and timing and quality
of avoidance response appear to be largely independent, and while long take-over
time did not predict collision outcome, kinematically late initiation of avoidance
did. Hence, system design should focus on achieving kinematically early avoidance
initiation, rather than short take-over times.
Keywords: driver behaviour, automated driving, situation awareness, reaction time,
critical event kinematics
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1. Introduction
The advent of automated vehicles promises a number of benefits, including an
increase in the flow and capacity of the road network (Kesting et al., 2008, Ntousakis
et al., 2015), a wide range of economic benefits (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015), an
increase in shared mobility (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015), and a reduction in energy
consumption (Anderson et al., 2014). Many of these forecasts have received a great
deal of attention in recent years, including those predicting that vehicle automation
will result in a reduction in road traffic accidents (Bertoncello and Wee, 2015).
The aim of partial (SAE, 2016; Level 2; L2) automated driving systems is to relieve
drivers of the moment-to-moment demands of the control (lateral and longitudinal),
yet not supervision, of the driving task. In conditional (SAE Level 3; L3) automated
driving systems, drivers can relinquish both control and supervision of the driving
task. However, drivers are still expected to be responsible for the safety of the
vehicle when operating these systems, and should be available to resume manual
control, should the system reach some limit, for example, due to poorly marked lane
boundaries. During automated driving, drivers may shift their attention away from
information relevant to the driving task, for instance, the traffic environment or the
status of the automated driving system, to one of a range of non-driving related
activities (Carsten et al., 2012). This shift in attention potentially impairs drivers’
ability to perceive, comprehend, and predict events in the road scene, diminishing
their situation awareness (SA) (Endsley, 1995, De Winter et al., 2014). A key human
factors concern regarding L2 and L3 systems is that drivers with deteriorated SA may
be ill-prepared to regain the attention and motor control necessary to safely navigate
the vehicle, if a system limit is reached and manual intervention (or ’take-over’)
is required; an issue often referred to as the out-of-the-loop (OoTL) performance
problem (Endsley and Kiris, 1995).
There is evidence to suggest that the non-driving related task drivers engage in
during automation may affect how quickly moreover, safely they can resume control
(Gold et al., 2013; Zeeb, Buchner, and Schrauf, 2015; Radlmayr et al., 2014; Merat et
al., 2014; Louw et al., 2015), though there is little consensus. For instance, Merat et
al. (2012) compared drivers’ responses to critical incident scenarios, while engaging in
a verbal ”20 Questions Task” (TQT). Compared to when drivers were not engaging in
the TQT, the TQT had no effect on how long it took drivers to start the lane change,
but it did affect their ability to reduce the vehicle’s speed to a safe level quickly.
In contrast, Neubauer et al. (2012) found that drivers engaging in a mobile phone
conversation during a take-over, had shorter brake reaction times to a lead vehicle,
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compared to those who were not engaging in a mobile phone conversation. This lack
of consensus is not surprising as studies have employed different experimental traffic
scenarios (Naujoks et al., 2014, Radlmayr et al., 2014), with varying time-budgets
(Gold et al., 2013; Dambo¨ck et al., 2012; van den Beukel and van der Voort, 2013),
and human-machine interfaces (HMI), and in simulators of varying degrees of fidelity.
As non-driving related tasks demand different levels of drivers’ visual attention, it is
important to compare the effect of a range of tasks.
In this study, conducted as part of the EU AdaptIVe project, we aimed to
systematically take drives OoTL, by applying a number of screen manipulations that,
to varying degrees, limited the amount of system and environmental information
available to drivers during automation, before presenting critical and non-critical
take-over events. During these events, instead of a ’take-over request’, we used an
’uncertainty’ alert, which required drivers to monitor the road scene and determine
whether there was a need to resume control from automation. These manipulations
were introduced by Louw et al. (2015, 2016) and Louw and Merat (2017), and
are detailed further below. Previously, we showed that, during automated driving,
drivers’ eye-gaze concentration was differentially affected by the OoTL manipulations
(Louw and Merat, 2017), as was the location of drivers’ first eye-fixations in the road
scene, after the manipulations ceased (Louw et al., 2016). However, these differences
resolved within 2 s of the manipulations ceasing. While these studies have illustrated
how vehicle automation affects drivers’ visual attention when ’coming back into the
loop’, precisely whether and how the degree of visual information available to drivers
during automation affects their perceptual-motor performance during the take-over
is not clear, nor is what constitutes ’good’ performance, in this context. This study
aimed to investigate these issues.
A number of measures and metrics have been used to study drivers’ take-over
process once they have resumed control, including time to hands-on the steering wheel
(Zeeb, Buchner, and Schrauf, 2015), time to disengage automation (take-over time;
Dambo¨ck et al., 2014; Gold et al., 2014; Zeeb, Buchner, and Schrauf, 2015, 2016),
reaction time to an obstacle (Neubauer et al., 2012), first gaze to the road centre
(Gold et al., 2013; Louw et al., 2016). Take-over time in particular has been used
widely to judge driver performance during the resumption of control (for a review see
Eriksson and Stanton, 2017). However, we have previously argued that take-over time
measures may not be the most appropriate indicator of drivers’ preparedness for, or
appreciation of the unfolding situation (Louw et al., 2015), as drivers could simply be
reacting to take-over requests (TOR) from the system. Indeed, as reported in studies
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on braking behaviours in manual driving, there exists a driver-related delay between
initial brake application and full emergency braking (Ising et al., 2012; Hirose et al.,
2008; Perron et al., 2001; Kiesewetter et al., 1999; Yoshida et al., 1998). Therefore,
the current study analysed not only drivers’ take-over time, but also, the time it takes
for them to react to a threat in the road environment, as was considered by others,
such as Petermeijer et al. (2017).
While understanding the timing (Gold et al., 2013) and sequence (Zeeb, Buchner,
and Schrauf, 2016) of behaviours during the take-over is important, there is also
a need to understand whether, and how, automation affects the quality of drivers’
vehicle control following a take-over, as drivers do not mitigate all risk just by
resuming control or initiating a manoeuvre. Quality of vehicle control has previously
be described by vehicle-based measures, such as maximum accelerations during vehicle
control in the transition (Gold et al., 2013; Zeeb, Buchner, and Schrauf, 2015; Hergeth
et al., 2016), minimum Time To Collision (TTC; Gold et al., 2013, Louw et al., 2015),
minimum time headway to an obstacle (Merat and Jamson, 2009; Merat et al., 2014;
Louw et al., 2015). However, their interpretation is often constrained to the particular
scenario under investigation. Therefore, to provide scenario-independent measures of
drivers’ capabilities for vehicle control, and thus take-over quality, a possible solution
is to analyse drivers’ responses in relation to the kinematics of an unfolding situation,
i.e. the criticality at the point at which they respond. Inverse Time To Collision
(invTTC), for example, is a measure that accounts for the visual looming effect of a
braking lead vehicle (Lee, 1976; Summala et al., 1998; Groeger, 2000; Kiefer et al.,
2003, 2005), and is an important crash risk indicator (Kondoh et al., 2008). The
looming argument is closely related to the tau hypothesis. Inverse tau is the ratio
between the lead vehicle’s optical expansion rate on the driver’s retina, and its optical
size, therefore, describing visual looming. Inverse tau is simply a visually available
estimate of invTTC (Lee, 1976), though the latter was used in the current paper due
to it being easier to calculate.
Victor et al. (2015) and Markkula et al. (2016) used this measure to show that
a majority of drivers involved in naturalistic crash and near-crash scenarios during
manual driving, reacted within 1 s of the kinematic urgency of the scenario, reaching
values of invTTC ≈ 0.2 s−1, which suggests that the timing and response rate of
drivers’ initial response appears to be anchored to the criticality of the unfolding
event. Based on their findings, Markkula et al. (2016) proposed that how drivers
make use of and act on visual looming information from a lead vehicle in manual
driving may also explain drivers’ response processes when suddenly brought back into
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the control loop in automated driving. Some evidence of this in automation may be
found in an extended interpretation of the work of Gold et al. (2013). The authors
found that drivers who were given longer time budgets in a take-over scenario took
longer to intervene. However, it may be that the visual looming effect played some
part in when drivers decided to intervene, and the current paper seeks to investigate
this in more detail. If not being in physical vehicle control due to automation causes
a mismatch between drivers’ internal model of a vehicle’s dynamics and the actual
vehicle dynamics (Russell et al., 2016), then their ability to respond in manner that
is appropriate for the criticality of the situation in hand may be impaired (cf. Fajen
and Devaney, 2006; Fajen, 2008; Markkula et al., 2016).
The current study sought to evaluate this hypothesis, by analysing the timing and
rate of drivers’ responses (i.e. how fast they move brake pedal and steering wheel) in
relation to the kinematics of the unfolding situation, and how this interacts with the
degree of visual information available to drivers pre-take-over.
We hypothesised that drivers deprived of all visual information from the system
and road environment would be furthest OoTL and, therefore, take-over control later
and have the least consistent perceptual-motor control, than those who performed
visual and non-visual tasks pre-take-over. However, drivers who had access to all
visual information during automation were hypothesised to be the most in the loop
and would, therefore, take-over control the earliest and have the most consistent
perceptual-motor control during the transition.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Following ethical approval from the University of Leeds Research Ethics Committee
(Reference Number: LTTRAN-054, seventy-five drivers (41 male), aged 21-69 years
(M=36, SD=12) were recruited via the participant database of the University of Leeds
Driving Simulator (UoLDS) and were reimbursed £20 for participation. Participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Their average annual mileage was 8290
miles (SD=6723), and all participants had held a full driving licence for at least three
years (M=16, SD=12) and drove at least twice a week. Participants details for each
group are displayed in Table 1.
2.2. Materials
The experiment was conducted in the fully motion-based UoLDS, which consists of
a Jaguar S-type cab housed in a 4m spherical projection dome with a 300◦ field-of-view
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Table 1: Participant demographics for each OoTL condition.
Condition No. years holding
a full UK driving li-
cense (SD)
Mean annual
mileage (SD)
Mean age
(SD)
Number of
Male par-
ticipants
Number of
Female par-
ticipants
No Fog 16.07 (9.76) 9236 (12037) 36 (9) 8 7
No Fog + n-back 15.2 (10.29) 8780 (2392) 37 (11) 9 6
Light Fog 19.57 (14.13) 9967 (6650) 38 (13) 10 5
Heavy Fog 19.73 (16.5) 7800 (4068) 39 (15) 10 5
Heavy Fog + Task 9.89 (7.19) 5333 (3590) 29 (10) 4 11
projection system. A v4.5 Seeing Machines faceLAB eye-tracker was used to record
eye movements at 60Hz.
2.3. OoTL Manipulations
To vary the degree to which drivers had access to visual information from the
system and road environment during automation, we applied one of five OoTL
manipulation techniques, which have been described previously in Louw et al. (2015,
2016) and Louw and Merat (2017), but are repeated in Table 2 and shown in Figure 1.
As outlined in Figure 1, it was anticipated that drivers in the No Fog conditions would
be the most in the loop and drivers in the Heavy Fog + Task condition would the
most out of the loop (See Table 2). For the conditions that used a fog manipulation,
we drew a canvass over the existing screens to change the brightness. The colour of
the canvass was set to RGB 0.5 0.5 0.5 and the transparency was set to 0.0 for Heavy
Fog and 0.09 for Light Fog, where 0.0 is no transparency and 1.0 is full transparency.
In the two task conditions, participants were expected to engage with the tasks.
However, in the other conditions, participants were not instructed to behave in any
particular way.
2.4. Automated driving system
The automated driving system was only available when the vehicle was travelling
between 65 and 75 mph in the centre of the middle lane. Drivers could engage the
system by pressing a button on the steering wheel. When automation was engaged,
and drivers’ hands and feet were off the controls, automation could be disengaged by
either pressing a button on the steering wheel, turning the steering wheel more than
2◦, or depressing the brake pedal. If participants did not engage automation within
5 s of maintaining the vehicle position in the centre of the middle lane, the system
engaged automatically. Once engaged, the system assumed lateral and longitudinal
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Table 2: Description of the OoTL conditions.
Condition Description Motivation/Aim
No Fog The road scene was not manipulated in any way. This served as a baseline condition, where
drivers had access to all visual information
from the system and road environment dur-
ing automation.
No Fog + n-back The road scene was not manipulated in any
way, but participants completed the 1-back task
(Mehler et al., 2011) during automation, where
they heard a sequence of single digit numbers and
were expected to repeat out loud the last number
presented.
The aim was to simulate situations where
drivers had access to all visual information
from the system and road, but they were
engaged in a non-visual task.
Light Fog A translucent grey filter was superimposed on the
road scene.
The aim was to give drivers the opportu-
nity to perceive elements in the immediate
vicinity of the road environment but not
further afield, and to hinder their ability to
accurately predict how road events might
unfold in the future.
Heavy Fog An opaque grey filter overlaid the road scene block-
ing all visual information from the road environ-
ment.
The aim was to simulate situations where
drivers are completely looking away from
the road scene and are unaware of the traf-
fic conditions but not engaged in any other
activity.
Heavy Fog +
Task
An opaque grey filter overlaid the road scene block-
ing all visual information from the road environ-
ment. A visually presented secondary task was
projected onto the front scene, which involved a se-
ries of web-based multiple-choice IQ test questions
requiring verbal answers. Questions related to
visuo-spatial shape-matching, general knowledge
questions, and moderately challenging mathemat-
ics.
The aim was to simulate situations where
drivers are not attending to visual informa-
tion from the system or road environment,
due to interaction with a visual secondary
task.
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Figure 1: An example of drivers’ view in the (a) no fog, no fog + n-back, (b) light fog, (c) heavy
fog, and (d) heavy fog + task conditions..
control and adjusted the vehicle’s speed to maintain 70 mph, which is the national
speed limit for dual carriageways and motorways in the UK. All participants were
told in the pre-experiment briefing session that they were to follow the normal rules
of the road.
2.5. Human-machine interface
The human-machine interface (HMI) used for automation status related to the
colour of a steering wheel symbol located in the vehicle’s central display unit (Figure
2). This was solid grey when automation was unavailable, flashed green when available,
and appeared solid green when active. For each event (see below), at the end of the
OoTL manipulations, instead of a take-over request, drivers were presented with an
’uncertainty alert’. This was indicated by a flashing yellow symbol, which invited
drivers to monitor the roadway and intervene, if they deemed necessary. If the driver
deactivated the automation, the symbol appeared solid red for 2 s. Automation
activation and deactivation were accompanied by an auditory tone (1000Hz, 0.2 s).
In all conditions, a Forward Collision Warning (FCW) symbol included to the left
of the automation status symbol gave drivers a visual estimate of the lead vehicle
headway and a continuous alarm sounded if drivers reached an acceleration-based
time-to-collision (TTC) of 2 s.
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Figure 2: An example of the in-vehicle HMI with the Forward Collision Warning symbol on the left
and the Automation Status Symbol on the right (flashing green in this example).
2.6. Experimental and Scenario Design
Five groups of 15 participants each were recruited for this study. All participants
conducted an automated and manual (without the OoTL manipulations) drive, which
were counterbalanced across participants. However, given the scope of this paper,
only results of performance during the automated drive is included here. A 5 X 2
repeated-measures mixed design was used, with OoTL Manipulation (No Fog, Light
Fog, Heavy Fog, Heavy Fog+Quiz, No Fog+n-back) as a between-participant factor
and Event Number (1-6) as a within-participant factor.
Each experimental drive lasted about 20 minutes and encompassed six discrete
car-following events, within a free-flowing three-lane motorway, with ambient traffic.
As shown in Figure 3, each drive contained two critical events (2,6) and four non-
critical events (1,3,4,5). For all events, 7 s before the uncertainty alert, a vehicle
entered the lane ahead, from the right. In the critical events, after 3 s of the OoTL
manipulations ending, the lead vehicle decelerated at a rate of 5.0 m/s2. This resulted
in a collision if, after 3 s from the lead vehicle brake onset, there was no driver action.
In the non-critical events, after 3 s of the OoTL manipulations ending, the lead
vehicle either sped up or changed lane to the left, nullifying the event criticality.
2.7. Procedure
Upon arrival, participants read a hand-out which contained details of the ex-
periment, but which did not include information on the critical situations. After
signing the consent form, participants completed a 15-minute familiarisation drive,
consisting of non-critical events only. This began with a short manual drive. Once
familiar with the simulator controls, participants practised activating/deactivating
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Lead  vehicle
Non-critical Critical
1 2 3 4 5 6
≈150s
a b dc
Ego vehicle
100 s 3 s 3 s30 s
Event:
Figure 3: Schematic representation of each discrete event in the experimental drive. (a) to (d)
represent various phases of the drive, where (a) denotes automation being engaged, (b) denotes the
start of the OoTL manipulations, (c) denotes the end of the OoTL manipulations and the start of
the uncertainty alert, and (d) denotes the start of the lead vehicle braking in the critical event.
the automation, were shown how the HMI communicated automation states, and
experienced the OoTL manipulations. Participants then completed the experimental
drive described in the previous section and shown in Figure 3. Each event began
with a 30 s period of automated driving with no OoTL manipulation, after which
the manipulations would be active for 100 s before ceasing and being replaced by an
uncertainty alert. Participants completed a post-experiment survey, which probed
aspects relating to trust and acceptance of the automated driving system. However,
no interesting results emerged, therefore, and in the interest of space and scope of
the paper, they are not included here.
2.8. Analysis of drivers’ perceptual-motor performance
Reaction time measures
Two metrics were adopted for quantifying timing measures during the take-over
process: The first was take-over time (t take−over), which was defined as a measure of
the time between the end of the OoTL manipulations and a driver’s disengagement
of the automated driving system (by either pressing a button on a steering wheel,
turning the steering wheel more than 2◦, or depressing the brake pedal). We also
computed action time (taction), which was defined as the time from the end of the
OoTL manipulation, to when the driver started a significant deceleration or steering
action that was clearly intended to mitigate the impending crash. It is worth noting
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that participants were not given any instruction as to how they should deal with a
potential collision scenario.
During our studies, we have found that, in many cases, drivers touched the steering
wheel but did not initiate an evasive steering action, and similarly, they often pressed
the brake pedal but did not engage in an evasive braking action. Therefore, we looked
for a clear steering or braking action and then searched for the starting point of
this committed action. We developed a MATLAB (version R2015b, MathWorks)
tool to allow the experimenter to judge when the driver committed to their response
action. The following steps were taken to analyse taction for the braking and steering
responses, collected at a sampling rate of 60 Hz:
1. The brake pedal signal and steering wheel signal were each filtered with a 1st
order low-pass Butterworth filter, with a cut-off frequency of 3 Hz for braking,
and 6 Hz for steering.
2. (a) For braking, the first local maximum brake pedal sample greater than 4
was identified (Red diamond marker in Figure 4). The brake pedal sample
represented a unit-less value of brake effort, on a scale of 0 to 450.
(b) For steering, the local maxima and minima values with an amplitude
threshold of ±2.5◦ were first identified, as per Schmidt et al. (2014). Then,
the global maximum steering wheel angle amplitude prior to the lane
change manoeuvre was identified (Red diamond marker in Figure 5).
3. To identify the start point of the manoeuvre (taction), two criteria were used.
First, we identified the end of the plateau in brake or steering signal before the
point identified above, such that there was less than a 0.0005 difference in values
between consecutive samples (Red square markers in Figures 4 and 5). Second,
to ensure accuracy, each start point was manually confirmed on a case-by-case
basis, based on changes to the vehicle’s speed and longitudinal acceleration, for
braking, and the vehicle’s offset and lateral acceleration, for steering. Minor
adjustments to the location of the start points were made where necessary.
4. taction was calculated as the time from the end of the OoTL screen manipulations
(Figure 3) to the time corresponding to the start point identified in the previous
step.
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Figure 4: Example plot from the analysis of a brake signal, to determine taction. Longitudinal
acceleration values are multiplied by 10 for illustration purposes.
Figure 5: Example plot from the analysis of a steering signal, to determine taction. Lateral
acceleration and vehicle offset values are multiplied by 10 for illustration purposes.
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Vehicle control
To determine the quality of drivers’ vehicle control after resuming control, we
considered whether drivers were able to scale the rate of their collision avoidance
response to the event criticality. For this, we calculated and correlated two different
measures.
The first measure was Inverse Time To Collision (invTTC; Kiefer et al., 2003,
2005) at taction, and was used to quantify the criticality of the unfolding event at the
point drivers began their collision avoidance manoeuvre. invTTC was calculated as
relative speed divided by distance gap between the ego and lead vehicle, which takes
the lead vehicle deceleration into account.
The second measure was the maximum derivative (Dmax) of the control input
that drivers used to avoid the collision, and was used to assess the rate and force of
drivers’ response to the critical event (Green circle marker in Figure 4 and Figure
5). Dmax was taken from the time period between the response onset (taction) and
the maximum value of the respective control input. If drivers changed lane, then
steering wheel angle was used, and if they braked, then brake pedal position was
used. If drivers braked then steered, then steering wheel angle was used. For both
steering avoidance (Markkula et al., 2014) and braking avoidance (Markkula et al.,
2016), drivers scale the rate of their avoidance manoeuvre (i.e. Dmax), to looming, as
measured by invTTC. By correlating invTTC at taction and Dmax, we aimed to assess
(i) whether similar situation-adaptive control behaviour would be present just after
a take-over from automated driving, and if so, (ii) whether it would be affected by
the OoTL manipulations. Specifically, as suggested in the Introduction, that drivers
who had access to less visual information during automation, would generally have a
more scattered correlation between invTTC at taction and Dmax.
As braking and steering inputs are measured in different units, they could not
be analysed as a single data set, without first being transformed. To achieve this,
separate regression equations were calculated for the steering and braking responses
between invTTC and taction. Next, the Dmax values of the braking responses were
transformed such that the intercept and slope of the regression equation was the
same as that of the steering responses, allowing for the comparison of braking and
steering responses.
Statistical analyses
The data were not normally distributed, therefore, Kendall’s non-parametric rank
correlation was used on the correlations between t take−over and taction, and between
invTTC at taction and Dmax. In addition, Kendall’s rank correlation was used because,
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compared to Spearman’s rank correlation, its p values are more accurate with smaller
sample sizes (Howell, 2012). Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient τ was used here
as a measure of goodness of fit. This was calculated using the cor.test R function in
the ’MASS’ package using the ”kendall” method (Venables and Ripley, 2002). For
illustration purposes, the approximate slopes and intercepts of the various factors
were also calculated using robust linear regression, using the rlm R function in the
’MASS’ package with default settings (Venables and Ripley, 2002). To test for an
effect of the OoTL manipulations on t take−over and taction, Kruskal-Wallis H tests were
conducted using SPSS V.21 (IBM, Armonk, NY, USA).
Included in this study, based on 15 participants in each of the five OoTL ma-
nipulation groups and two critical events per participant, there were 150 transition
cases considered for the analysis. However, twenty-six cases were excluded for various
reasons. In 13 cases, drivers avoided a collision by changing lane but, at the point
of automation disengagement, the initial steering wheel angle exceed ±5◦ (which
was possible because the steering wheel was not self-correcting) and there were no
subsequent salient steering inputs. This indicated the lane change was due to a slow
drift and the driver’s intentional response could not be determined confidently. In 11
cases, drivers steered while braking hard and thus skidded such that steering had no
effect. In 1 case, a driver did not respond at all, and in another the driver’s response
could not be determined using the method described above.
3. Results and Discussion
The results from this study will be presented with the aid of two types of graphs:
the first graph relates to the timing of drivers’ response and shows take-over time
(x-axis, t take−over) relative to action time (y-axis, taction), for example as illustrated
in Figure 6. If a data point falls on the dashed grey diagonal line, it indicates that
the driver began a collision avoidance manoeuvre at the same time as they resumed
control. The greater the distance along the y-axis between the data point and the
dashed diagonal line, the longer the time between when drivers resumed control and
initiated a manoeuvre. The red dashed lines on the x- and y-axes indicate the onset
of the vehicle brake light. The second graph relates to vehicle control and shows Dmax
(y-axis) relative to invTTC at the start of drivers’ response (x-axis), for example
as presented in Figure 7. This figure attempts to demonstrate the rate of drivers’
steering or braking input, during their collision avoidance manoeuvre, in relation to
the kinematic urgency faced by drivers when they began their manoeuvre (i.e. the
visual looming from the lead vehicle).
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Table 3: Mean (SD) of take-over time and action time for the five OoTL conditions.
No Fog No Fog + n-
back
Light Fog Heavy Fog +
Task
Heavy Fog
ttake−over (s) 3.70 (1.22) 4.11 (1.07) 4.13 (1.11) 4.39 (1.03) 4.53 (0.51)
taction (s) 4.95 (0.91) 4.93 (0.99) 4.68 (0.72) 4.96 (1.02) 5.10 (0.87)
Results from a Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that, the lower the degree of visual
information available to drivers during automation (from left to right in Figure 6), the
slower they tended to take-over control (t take−over, χ
2(4) = 9.820, p <0.05; Table 3).
However, an additional Kruskal-Wallis H test showed there was no difference between
the groups regarding when drivers began their collision avoidance manoeuvre (taction,
χ2(4) = 1.927, p = .749; Table 3), which suggests that, the further OoTL drivers
were, the higher the likelihood of a simultaneous take-over and manoeuvre initiation.
Figure 6 also shows that drivers who had access to all visual information pre-take-
over (No Fog group), were most likely to resume control before the onset of the lead
vehicle braking, suggesting more anticipatory responses. However, when drivers were
either engaged in a non-driving related task and/or had some or all visual information
withheld from them pre-take-over, they were more likely to resume control after the
lead vehicle braked. These results suggest that the more OoTL drivers were, the more
they reacted to external traffic than to system information, following the cessation of
the OoTL manipulations.
Figure 6: taction relative to t take−over for the five OoTL conditions in both critical events. Red
triangles show collisions and black circles show non-collisions. Note how, from leftmost to rightmost
panel, the general pattern is that cases group further to the right in the panel, indicating later
t take−over for more OoTL drivers whereas the scatter in the vertical direction remains largely
unchanged (no statistically significant effect of the OoTL manipulations).
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Figure 7: Dmax of response relative to invTTC at taction for the five OoTL conditions in both
critical events. Triangles show collisions and circles show non-collisions. The blue lines are for
illustration purposes only, showing the outcome of robust linear regression.
Taking the situation kinematics into account, it is clear from Figure 7 that the
lower the degree of visual information available to drivers, the more likely they were
to respond at invTTC of over 0.3 s−1. It is also evident that the majority of drivers
across the groups responded before the criticality of the situation reached a value of
invTTC ≈ 0.3 s−1. This is consistent with the findings of Victor et al. (2015) and
Markkula et al. (2016), who showed that, during manual driving, drivers reacted
within 1 s of the kinematic urgency of the scenario, reaching values of invTTC ≈
0.2 s−1. Overall, as the situation became increasingly critical, drivers scaled the
rate of their avoidance response to the criticality of the situation, just as in manual
driving, both for braking (Markkula et al., 2016) and steering (Markkula et al., 2014).
Tau values shown in Figure 7 suggest that the rates of drivers’ responses were less
scattered the lower the degree of available visual information, which goes against
our hypotheses. We proposed that Tau may be a good measure of scatter, however,
considering the distribution of the data across the groups, Tau may not be the ideal
measure, as it is sensitive to how much of the invTTC range is covered. Therefore,
larger data sets with better coverage of the invTTC spectrum and/or more detailed
analysis methods might clarify this further. Qualitative inspection of the plots in
Figure 7 suggest that the general nature of the perceptual-motor scaling, in terms of
slope and intercept, was rather similar between the OoTL manipulations.
For all cases that resulted in a collision, drivers began their avoidance manoeuvre
when the situation criticality exceeded invTTC ≈ 0.3 s−1. However, this cannot fully
account for why drivers crashed in some cases, as in other cases drivers responded at
the same criticality and avoided a collision. Further explanation can be derived from
the type of response adopted by drivers after the take-over.
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Results showed that, in the majority of cases, drivers mainly steered in response to
the lead vehicle (68/124), while in 36/124 cases drivers mainly braked, and in 20/124
cases drivers braked then steered (Figure 8). This is consistent with findings of Gold
et al. (2013) and Blommer et al. (2017), who also found that a high proportion of
drivers steered in crash-imminent situations, following a take-over, despite the fact
that previous studies have shown braking to be the more common response in manual
driving (Adams, 1994). Figure 9 shows that drivers who braked after the situation
criticality reached invTTC ≈ 0.3 s−1, were unable to avoid a collision, despite clearly
scaling the rate of their brake response to the higher criticality of the situation. This
is not surprising, as it is a well known aspect of road vehicle dynamics that steering
collision avoidance remains a feasible option for a longer time than braking avoidance,
during the run-up to a potential collision (Rice and Dell’Amico, 1974; Lechner and
Malaterre, 2015).
Figure 8: Combined frequency of drivers’ responses in CE1 and CE2.
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Figure 9: Dmax of response relative to invTTC at taction for the three response categories. Triangles
show collisions and circles show non-collisions. The blue lines are for illustration purposes only,
showing the outcome of robust linear regression.
In terms of actual number of collisions with the lead vehicle, Figure 10 shows
that all collisions occurred in Critical Event 1 (CE1). While there were five cases in
Critical Event 2 (CE2) where drivers responded after the criticality reached invTTC
≈ 0.3 s−1, it is likely that the previous exposure might have helped these drivers make
the correct decision to apply steering. In none of the cases that resulted in collisions,
did drivers resume control or initiate a response before the onset of the lead vehicle
braking, which could indicate increased decision-making time to take-over control.
However, in 14 of the 108 non-collision, drivers resumed control (13 cases) or initiated
a response (1 case) before the onset of the lead vehicle braking, which could indicate
more anticipatory responses. Finally, Figure 10 shows that regressions were similar
between the CE1 and CE2, which suggests that drivers’ motor-control was largely
unaffected by whether they had previously experienced a critical event.
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Figure 10: Dmax of response relative to invTTC at taction for Critical Event 1 and Critical Event 2.
Triangles show collisions and circles show non-collisions. The blue lines are for illustration purposes
only, showing the outcome of robust linear regression.
4. Conclusions
The analyses presented here builds on the work of Gold et al. (2013), Zeeb,
Buchner, and Schrauf (2016), and Petermeijer et al. (2015), by providing some
insights into the importance of visual information for drivers’ perceptual-motor
performance in critical situations during the resumption of control from automation.
Previously, we reported that the OoTL manipulations influenced the location of
drivers’ first eye-fixations after the manipulations ended, but that the effects resolved
within 2 s (Louw et al., 2016). However, it was not clear whether the effect of the
manipulations ended there or if they had an effect on drivers’ perceptual-motor
control. One important finding from the current analysis is that, despite there
being no differences regarding where drivers directed their visual attention, the less
visual information available to drivers during automation, the later they took over
control. We hypothesised that the more OoTL drivers were, the less consistent their
perceptual-motor performance. However, there was no difference between the OoTL
groups regarding how long it took drivers to begin a collision avoidance manoeuvre,
or, indeed, whether they would experience a crash.
In addition, our subsequent kinematic analysis showed that the degree of visual
information available to drivers pre-take-over did not influence whether and how
drivers scaled the rate of their response to the situation criticality, at least not in
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any way that could be detected with the present data and analyses. This suggests
that the level of drivers’ situation awareness during automation has an impact on
the timing of their take-over (t take−over), but not necessarily on when they began
a collision avoidance manoeuvre (taction) or the quality of their subsequent vehicle
control (Dmax). These results are in contrast to the findings of Zeeb, Buchner, and
Schrauf (2016), who found that engaging in various secondary tasks did not delay how
long it took drivers to return their hands to the steering wheel, following a take-over
request, but it did cause a small delay in how long it took them to intervene in vehicle
control.This brings into question the usefulness of take-over time as a measure of
’good’ performance in the take-over.
Another finding is that the majority of drivers responded below invTTC ≈ 0.3 s−1,
which was common for cases that avoided a collision, while all cases that resulted in
a collision shared the following characteristics: First, for all collisions, drivers began
their evasive manoeuvre when the situation criticality was above invTTC ≈ 0.3 s−1.
Second, drivers who crashed only braked instead of only steering, or braking then
steering. Third, all collisions occurred in the first critical event, which is in line with
previous findings that drivers’ familiarisation with the event and experience with the
system, results in fewer interaction errors, and safer outcomes (Engstro¨m et al., 2010;
Lee et al., 2002; Benderius et al., 2014).
Our results are generally in line with those of Gold et al. (2013) and others, who
have found that drivers who are given less time to respond to a take-over request
react faster but subsequent vehicle control results in higher accelerations. Gold et
al. (2013) argued that this indicated that lane changes were riskier and, therefore,
that take-over quality was worse. However, regarding defining drivers’ capabilities
and limitations in such scenarios, based on our analysis, we conclude that drivers’
responses following a take-over are generally appropriately scaled to the criticality of
the unfolding situation, even though highly critical situations may not be desirable
from a safety point of view. Therefore, we use take-over ’quality’ to refer to drivers’
performance in relation to the situation, rather than to the criticality of the situation
itself.
Taken together, our results suggest that it is important that, following a take-over,
drivers act on any threat as early as possible in the kinematic scenario. While in
the current study the usefulness of take-over time has been questioned, situations
giving rise to take-over event will likely vary widely, and what is important is that
drivers are able to respond to system feedback promptly. Therefore, the fact that
the OoTL manipulations influenced how quickly drivers disengaged the automated
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driving systems has important HMI design implications for automated vehicles. For
instance, HMIs that emphasise situation-relevant information before the take-over
may facilitate safer take-over situations.
With increasing situation criticality, drivers clearly attempted to adjust the
rate of their collision avoidance response. Despite this, in many cases, drivers were
unsuccessful at avoiding a collision. This indicates that, should a system-initiated take-
over be required, automated driving systems must support drivers during the transfer
of physical vehicle control, by providing either advanced warning or vehicle control
that reduces the situation criticality, via, for example, haptic shared control, Collision
Mitigation by Braking (CMbB) or Emergency Steer Assist (ESA). A supportive HMI
could also encourage drivers who respond late in the kinematic scenario to apply
steering avoidance (the situation permitting, such as the one under investigation
here).
There are a number of limitations in the present study. First, all drivers performed
a manual drive identical in design to the automated drive, where they experienced two
non-critical lead vehicle braking events. The order in which participants experienced
the manual and automated drives were counterbalanced, which means that half of the
participants would have experienced the manual drive first. This may have influenced
the timing and magnitude of drivers’ responses in the following automated drive,
which suggests that our results potentially underestimate the effect of automation
on performance. This is especially relevant when one considers that all collisions in
the automated drives occurred in Critical Event 1, and 75% of these were when the
automated drive was performed first. Second, though there was no direct instruction
for drivers to resume control, the additional warnings from the lead vehicle brake
light and the FCW alarm may have had some impact on when drivers responded.
Thus, the looming effect was not the only cue of criticality. Finally, the small sample
size in the present study meant that driver characteristics such as age, gender, and
experience, could not be considered in detail. However, the sample was selected to be
as representative of the general population as possible.
The current study sets out some avenues for future work. For example, the
scattered gaze-fixations of colliders (Louw et al., 2016), possibly contributed to their
braking response starting late in the situation kinematics, and further work is required
to ratify this link, which, if found to be true, strengthens the argument for an HMI
that is able to direct drivers’ attention to relevant information. Furthermore, what
constitutes ’quality ’ regarding driver performance in the transition will vary according
to the level of responsibility being transferred as well as the road traffic situation
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itself, which motivates the need to evaluate a range of real-world take-over scenarios.
Finally, it is important to understand further how automation impacts on the
kinematic-dependencies of driver responses to critical events, as recent work by
Blommer et al. (2017) has shown that avoidance responses come later after a
transition out of automated driving than in manual driving. It remains an open
question whether or not drivers’ scaling of avoidance responses to kinematics also
change between manual and automated modes of driving.
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